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GIFTS
In the recent case of Boyd vs. Kilmer, 285 Pa. 533, 538,
it is said: "We recognize the rule as stated in Darlington's Est., 157 Pa. 624; Matthaei vs. Prownall, 235 Pa. 460,
and Corrigan vs. Conway, 269 Pa. 373, that where a conveyance of the greater, part of the grantor's estate is made
to one occupying a confidential relation it is not necessary
to establish actual fraud as a ground of reconveyance, in
absence of express proof on part of grantee that the transaction was fair and equitable, a court of equity will treat
the case as one of constructive fraud, and the only way to
establish the fairness of the transaction is by grantee clearly showing the value of grantor's property, that the inadequacy of the consideration has been called to his attention and that he received the benefit of intelligent advice."
It is proposed to trace the application of this doctrine
through the earlier Pennsylvania cases.
The case from which the foregoing is quoted involved
a grant of the entire estate of the grantor in return for a
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very inadequate consideration but the grantee was a neighbor who did not occupy a confidential relation to the grantor; the inadequacy of the consideration was called to the
attention of the grantor; and he not only received the benefit of intelligent advice but he was determined to carry out
the plan which he himself originated. Further, he was of
sound mind and well aware of what he was doing and his
purpose was to prevent relatives of his divorced wife from
getting any of his property after his death. The transfer
was accordingly sustained by the court.
In Darlington's Est., 147 Pa. 624, a note for $7,000 was
avoided because given to a nephew, who, at the time, was
the attorney-in-fact of the maker, and the latter was very
feeble and infirm when he signed the note, being eightyfour years of age. It was claimed the note was given for
maintenance for life but no formal agreement was executed by the payee assuming such an obligation. The relationship was held to be a confidential one, the Court saying:
"The confidential relation is not at all confined to any specific association of the parties to it. While its more frequent illustrations are between persons who are related as
trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney
and client, parent and child, husband and wife, it embraces
partners and copartners, principal and agent, master and
servant, physician and patient, and, generally, all persons
who are associated by any relation of trust and confidence."
The Court followed Yardley vs. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395,
in which it was held that the scrivener of a will assumed
such a relation and could take no considerable interest as
a legatee without making a full disclosure to the testator
of the proportion of the estate he was bequeathing him, and
"proving by affirmative testimony that the legacy was
the free, voluntary and intelligent act of the testator and
unaffected by any undue influence of the scrivener." * * *
"It is a rule of equity and of very ancient origin. In its
ordinary statement the fact of mental weakness in the
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grantor does not appear, -and it is not at all necessary to
the application of the rule in a given case. Many, if not
most, of the judicial illustrations of its application, are
devoid of this element."
The doctrine is eloquently justified in its application
to lawyers who prepare papers for their clients, in which
they name themselves as fiduciaries, in Greenfield's Est.,
14 Pa. 489. A provision in a trust deed allowing excessive
compensation to the trustees was stricken down. This was
done without the least evidence of fraud or undue influence
and although the grantor was entirely competent mentally.
In Darlington's Ap., 86 Pa. 512, a deed from a wife
to her husband, reserving a life estate for herself, was set
aside at the instance of a son more than thirty years after
it was made, and this without any proof of fraud, imposition, undue influence or mistake and the wife was mentally
competent.
The general rule was declared to be that the confidential relation amounts to a disqualification from acquiring
gratuities. The donee has the burden of establishing "perfect fairness, adequacy and equity." If no such proof is
established, courts of equity treat the case as one of constructive fraud."
The following is from Justice Trunkey's opinion in
the last named case. "It is equally unnecessary to show by
authority that the most dominant influence of all relations
is that of the husband over his wife. From the proud and
untutored savage to the cultured and refined Anglo-American, the wife is affectionately anxious to please her husband. This is first in her heart, whether she be in the menial service of a rude hut, or in daily toil for support of her
family, or in charge of an elegant mansion. When he commands, she obeys; when he persuades, she yields; when he
gently hints a wish, she grants. 'When treated almost as
a servant-when governed and corrected as a child, as did
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our sturdy ancestors-or when donfided in as a companion
and equal, her will is subdued to her lord. True, there are
exceptional women, whose nature is unaffected by marriage, who cannot yield or bend, and, as wives, would not
be happy, save with effeminate husbands; but these are not
so numerous as to cloud perception of the mental and
moral differences of the sexes. The common-law rights
and disabilities, consequent on marriage, grew out of these
differences, and the husband's power and infience distinctly appear. 'By marriage, the husband and wife are one
person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband;
under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs
everything; and is, therefore, called in our law-french a
feme covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covertbaron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is
called her coverture.' One of the reasons for suspension
of her legal existence is said to be 'for her own security in
guarding her against her husband's influence over her by
disabling her from disposing for her own property.' The
disabling to dispose of'her own property, of course, related
to her land, which she or her heir could hold and enjoy
after the end of the husband's estate therein. By marriage, he becomes entitled to all his wife's personalty and
the use of her lands. Under advancing culture and civilization, modern legislation has materially changed the common law respecting the rights and disabilities incident to
the marriage relation. In Pennsylvania, the wife may hold
and enjoy her own property, and easy modes are provided
for her disposal of it. But the unity of person remains,
resting on a foundation older than the common law, and
the husband's influence over his wife, so strongly expressed
by the common-law writers, will end only with the marriage relation itself. The unfeeling greed, that, in a less
refined age, transferred all the wife's personal property
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and the use of her real estate to her husband, is not entirely extinct. Many a husband, in all sincerity, believes
the common-law rule better than the statute, for the former accords with his avarice."
That a nurse and attendant may acquire such an influence as will bring her within these rules was decided
in Worrall's Ap., 110 Pa. 349.
In Darlington's Est., supra, it was said to be important
that a will made but a short time before the note was given
would be defeated, if the note was enforced. The payee
was bound to show that the attention of the testator was
called to this fact when he signed the note.
In Matthaei vs. Pownall, 235 Pa. 460, a deed to a physician of the grantor was set aside though the chancellor
found that the grantor understood what he was doing, that
he had offered the farm to others on the same terms and
that he acted on his own desires. The absence of any mental weakness did not prevent the conclusion of constructive
fraud, in the absence of clear proof that the value of the
grantor's property and the inadequacy of the bargain had
been honestly brought home to him, or that he had been
given the opportunity of independent advice. The only
attorney present was the one acting for the grantee.
See Sarver vs. Sarver, 230 Pa. 60.
In Corrigan vs. Conway, 269 Pa. 373, a woman conveyed her entire estate to a younger brother, who had
been transacting her business for her. The grantee employed the scrivener who prepared the deed. The grantor
executed the deed only by her mark but it was acknowledged and recorded. The opinion of the court directing
a reconveyance is reported in 27 Pa. Dist. R. 701, and it is
largely quoted with approval by the Supreme Court. "The
case presents what is called a constructive fraud, springing
from the confidential relations existing between the
parties; this peculiarity, withdrawing it from the operation
of ordinary rules, throws upon the beneficiaries the duty
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of showing expressly that the arrangement was fair and
conscionable beyond the reach of suspicion. In requiring
this, courts of equity act irrespective of any admixture
of deceit, imposition, overreaching or other positive fraud.
As has been often said, the principle stands independently
of such elements of active mischief; it is founded upon a
motive of general policy, and is designed to protect a
party, so far as may be, against his own overweening
confidence and self-delusion, the infirmities of a hasty
judgment, and even the impulses of a too sanguine temperament." See also Unruh vs. Lukens, 166 Pa. 324, 330.
A gift from father to son is so natural an act that the
presumption is in favor of its validity, and undue influence
must be proven. But in Stewart's Est., 137 Pa. 175, Justice McCollum said: "In view of the relations existing between the alleged donor and donee respecting the former's
property in Penna., and his great age and infirmity, it
ought to clearly appear that a gift was intended by him,
and that it was his voluntary and intelligent act." The
assignment of the judgment, the subject of the alleged
gift, was held to be "consistent with an understanding between the parties that the assignee should hold the judgment in trust for the assignor, and thus relieve the assignor of any care attending the control and collection if
it." The assignor was in his eighty-eighth year. But the
Court below said: "Undue influence may exist between
persons in full health of body and strength of mind; it is
only that the weakness of either tends to create a greater
feeling of dependence, and is the more liable to imposition,
and improvident impulses. But the prime inquiry in such
cases always is as to whether a relation of confidence between the donor and donee existed at the time of the alleged gift. If it did, then the latter shall take nothing by
the gift without satisfactory evidence that it was the clear
intent of the donor to confer the benefit obtained, after
having been fully advised with respect to the same, either
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by the donee himself or by some other and indifferent
party."
The presumptions in favor of gifts from parent to
child and from husband to wife are limited to these relations and they do not apply to any collaterals, even to
gifts from a brother to a sister. Such gifts stand on the
same basis as gifts to strangers. Irvine vs. Minshull, 152
P. 1150; Salt v. Anderson, 180 P. 873; Atwell vs. Watkins,
36 S. W. 103. For example, in Bret's Adm'r. vs. Mildebrand, 29 Lanc. L. Rev. 138, a sister, who had declared that
she was attending to her brother's business, though he was
living with another brother and sister, prepared two checks
to her own order and procured his execution and delivery
of them to herself. This declaration was held to be sufficient to establish a confidential relation and place upon
her the burden of proving that the gifts were not only
righteous but "conscientious," (Smith vs. Loafman, 145
Pa. 628) and that the donor had "acted intelligently, deliberately, and with full information of the amount of his
property, the effect upon his estate, the nature of the transaction, the effect thereof, and that no advantage was taken
of the confidential relation." The fact that the payee drew
the checks rendered the transaction "suspicious" and was
alone sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud, particularly as the drawer was without the protection of a disinterested adviser.
In Longenecker vs. Church, 200 Pa. 567, a gift of
bonds to a church in return for interest thereon for life
and a covenant to keep in repair a cemetery lot was sustained. The donor was an elderly woman in her sound
senses and the gift was suggested by a person not connected with the church and the gift did not seriously diminish the donor's estate. The opinion of the Court below
was commended by the Supreme Court as exhaustive and
satisfactory. It reviews the leading cases and points out
that the improvidence of the gift itself often may be evidence of a want of understanding of the transaction and
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that the donee is put upon the defensive whenever the
evidence discloses "some indication of weakness of mind,
undue influence, fraud, deception, confidential relation, or
other element, to render the transaction at least suspicious." The effect of undue influence upon the rights of
third parties who would benefit by it is also discussed.
"One who knowingly profits by a wrong becomes particips
criminis, however innocent he may have been in the first
instance: Irwin vs. Keen, 3 Wharton, 347. Let the hand
receiving it be ever so chaste, yet, if it comes through a
polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow
it. No one, be he near or remote, can justly found a claim
or title on a voluntary instrument which is not the well
understood act of the donor's mind: Russell's App. 75 Pa.
265; Gordon vs. McCarty, 3 Wharton, 407."
In Light vs. Light, 221 Pa. 136, a deed from an aunt
to her niece was set aside and the case illustrates a number
of circumstances which are influential in the decision of
these cases, e. g., the education and business experience of
the grantor or the lack of it; age, sex and the degree of
bodily strength to resist pressure, reliance of grantor upon
grantee in prior business transactions, etc. The defendant's conduct also illustrates many of the means which the
law forbids to be used to attain such ends. Importunities,
flattery, misstatements and threats of suicide were resorted to. An absolute transfer of title was procured,
though a reservation of a life estate to the grantor -had
been agreed upon. No advice was given the grantor by
counsel of her own choice. The deed was prepared by
counsel for the grantee and no consideration was paid or
counter-obligation assumed. The transfer was of the
bulk of the grantor's estate and her other relatives were
not consulted. These facts brought the case squarely
within the rule of the leading cases of Stepp vs. Frampton
and Hasel vs. Beilstein, 179 Pa. 284 and 560. In both these
cases younger men ingratiated themselves into an intimacy
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with old men, finally undertaking to advise them as to
the disposition of their property and procuring gratuitous
transfers of large portions of it to themselves. Both
cases support the relevancy of proof of the character and
disposition of the donor in money matters as bearing on
the probability that the transaction was not fully understood and that imposition was practiced. Of course, the
character of the donor as one easily influenced or the contrary is always an important element in these cases. Likewise, if the transfer will defeat the accomplishment of
other intentions recently expressed, e. g. in a will lately
executed, the doubt arises as to whether the effect of the
act is fully undrstood and whether it is the free and voluntary act of the donor.
In Hutchins's Est., 17 D. R. 648, one who knew he had
been named as prospective executor in the will of an aged
woman alleged that in effect a parol revocation of the
written will had been made and the bulk of the estate
given to him in trust for certain others for life but ultimately for his own benefit. The claim was scathingly denounced by Judge Penrose and relief was granted though a
final adjudication had to be opened to do it.
In Smith's Est., 237 Pa. 115, 118, Justice Stewart said:
"We have said in Fross's App., 105 Pa. 258, that the evidence of a gift inter vivo. must, after the death of the alleged donor, be clear and satisfactory; and in Wise's Est.,
182 Pa. 168, that it is required to be clear and convincing.
Numerous other cases might be cited to show that a mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice to sustain a
gift where the question arises after the death of the alleged donor. The execution of the purpose to give, that
is, by delivery, may be shown either by declarations or
admissions of the alleged donor, or it may be gathered
from his acts when accompanied by other indicia of a gift;
but whether in one way or the other, or both, the evidence
must disclose a clear and unmistakable intention on the
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part of the donor at the time, to withdraw or surrender
his dominion over the subject of the gift. Except as such
intention is shown to accompany the act relied on, the delivery is incomplete." See also Turner's Est., 244 Pa. 568
at p. 572.
A clear and unmistakable intention to make a gift
is an essential requisite of a gift inter vivos. The donee
is incompetent to prove this fact when he is the surviving
party to the transaction, Kotz vs. Smith, 253 Pa. 346, and
Cooper's Est., 263 Pa. 37. "Primarily, the donee must
show an executed gift, not only because the original ownership is presumed to continue, but because the defense is
an affirmative one which necessarily carries with it this
duty. McConville vs. Ingham, 268 Pa. 507, 518; Yeager's
Est., 273 Pa. 359, 362. To establish a gift inter vivos, two
essential elements must be made to appear; an intention
to make the donation then and there, and an actual or constructive delivery at the same time, of a nature sufficient
to divest the giver of all dominion, and invest the recipient
therewith: Reese vs. Phila. Trust Co., 218 Pa. 150; Ashman's Est., 223 Pa. 543; Yeager's Est., supra. Prior possession is sufficient to sustain detinue by the prior possessor against anyone who cannot show a superior right of
posession. The burden of proof is upon one claiming to
be the donee of property to establish all facts essential to
such gift, Maxler vs. Hawk, 233 Pa. 316. Possession after the death of the alleged donor has little, if any weight,
on the question of a gift, where the claimant had access to
the property and effects of the alleged donor during his last
sickness, or after his death. In such a case proof in support of the claim ought to be clear and satisfactory upon
every point essential to title by gift, Scott vs. Reed, 153
Pa. 14. Even in the case of negotiable securities transferable by delivery the burden of proof that they were obtained bona fide is thrown on the party alleging it by very
slight circumstances, Porter vs. Gunnison, 2 Grant, 297.
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While generally the endorsement of a check to one in absolute form raises a presumption of a gift, where the act
is that of an aged woman, and the endorsee is her grandchild, who spent most of her time with her grandmother,
the transaction is presumed void, McConville vs. Ingham, supra.
A gift may easily be defeated merely because the
donee lacks admissible evidence of the fact. *Thus, in
Reading Trust Co. vs. Thompson, 254 Pa. 333, the treasurer
of a trust company was compelled to surrender a block of
negotiable bonds because his own testimony was excluded
and he was without other proof of the alleged gift. The
claimant had charge of the vault where the alleged donor
kept his bonds but in a private box of which he had the
keys. The possibility that the bonds might have been left
outside the box by accident or that the claimant might
have-been given them for some special purpose, imposed
on the claimant the burden of showing that his possession
was more than a mere custody or agency and that the alleged donor intended to divest himself of the property.
Where the claimant can show there was no possibility
of his wrongfully obtaining possession of a check drawn to
his order, his possession of it will justify a conclusion of
an executed gift, Campbell's Est., 274 Pa. 546.
Title to a stock certificate may be transferred by delivery merely without endorsement and the affixing of
tax stamps, the provisions of the Uniform Stock- Transfer
Act of 1911, P. L. 126, being intended merely for the protection of the corporation, Connell's Est., 282 Pa. 555.
The same is true of a certificate of deposit and non-negotiable securities generally, Schaffer vs. Hoke, 80 Super.
434. But since the delivery may easily have been merely
for safekeepirig, the claimant must meet the burden of
proof of a gift by proof that is clear and satisfactory,
Smith's Est., 237 Pa. 115; Sullivan vs. Hess, 241 Pa. 407, 410.
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
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COMMONWEALTH VS. TREVOR
Criminal Law and Procedure -- Robbery - Evidence - Record of
Former Conviction Admitted to Attack CredibilityRight
to Question Defendant- Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

Indictment for robbery. Defendant testified denying guilt. The
court allowed the presecution to prove by the record, a conviction of
Trevor for larceny, for the purpose of diminishing his credibility as a
witness. The only evidence of identity of the Trevor convicted with
the Trevor now on trial was the similarity of the name (Samuel
Trevor). The conviction was in the county where the present trial
is.
Wiest, for Commonwealth.
Zakum, for Defendant.

OPINION OF'THE COURT
Williams, J. The trial court permitted the Commonwealth to attack the defendant's credibility as a witness by introducing the record of a conviction for larceny of a person whose name is identical
with that of the defendant. The conviction for larceny occurred in
the county where the present trial is. The defendant assigns as error
to this court the admission of the record of former conviction and
also-asserts that the present defendant has not been properly identified as the person named in the former conviction.
The common law prohibited a person who had been convicted of
a felony or other infamous crime from testifying as a witness in any
other proceeding. The fact of conviction could be established either
by the record of conviction itself or by admissions of the person
whose credibility was attacked. The common law rule still prevails
unless changed by statutory enactments. Various statutes have been
enacted which have lai-gely abrogated the common law rule. A perusal of these statutes is necessary for the proper determination of this

case.
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The acts of May 21, 1885, P. L. 23 and of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158,
permitted a person who had previously been convicted of a crime, to
testify in his own behalf except where there has been a conviction of
perjury or subordination of perjury. These acts merely made such
persons competent witnesses. The common law rule as to the admission of records of former convictions remained unchanged.
The act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20 which provides as follows:
"Any person charged with any crime and called as a witness in his
own behalf shall not be asked, and, if asked, shall not be required to
answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been
charged with, or has been convicted of any offense other than the one
wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has
been of bad character or reputation; unless he shall have at such
trial personally or by his advocate, asked questions of a witness for
the prosecution with the view to establish his own good character or
reputation; or, he shall have testified against a co-defendant charged
with the same defence" does not expressly forbid the admission of a
record of former conviction. Is it proper for this court to extend the
statute to the case at bar by implication? We are of the opinion that
it is not. The legislature at the time of enacting the statute is presumed to know the existing law. The law at the time of the enactment of this statute permitted such a record to be shown. Commonwealth vs. Racco, 255 Pa. 113 . If it had been the intent of the legislature to exclude records of former convictions it could easily have
done so by the express provision to that effect. This court is not
warranted in giving the act such a broad interpretation. To do so
would be tantamount to legislation, Commonwealth vs. Pezzzner, Appellant, 78 Super. 287; Commonwealth vs. John Doe, Appellant, 78
Super. 162; Commonwealth vs. Vis, 81 Super. 384.
The argument of counsel for the defendant that to permit such
a record to be shown will force the jury to decide collateral issues is
untenable. The record of conviction is conclusive of guilt of the
person named in the record.
The only remaining question is whether there is sufficient proof
that the defendant in the present case is the person named in the
record of the former conviction. The action in the present case is in
the same county as the previous conviction. The names are identical
We believe it to be quite improbable that there would exist in the
same county two persons, bearing the same name and being charged
with a crime of the same general nature. The defendant is in court
and it is placing no undue burden upon him, if he is not the person
named in the previous conviction to offer evidence to establish that
fact, Commonwealth vs. John Doe, Appellant, spura. Judgment of
the court below is affirmed.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The act of March 15th, 1911, P. L. 20, forbids simply certain interrogations of the defendant who has become a witness. He cannot
be questioned as to commission of other crimes, whether convicted of
them or not. It does not prevent proof of other crime by the record
of convictions, Commonwealth vs. Doe, 79 Super. 162.
The identity of name, with the other circumstances mentioned by
the court below justify its conclusion that a conviction of the defendant for larceny might be considered by the jury as established by a
conviction in same county, and near the same time of a Samuel
Trevor for larceny. No effort was attempted by the defendant to
question his identity with the defendant in the earlier case, of the
same name.
We commend the opinion of the lower court for its precision and
lucidity. The judgment is affirmed.

ARTER VS. HARRISON
Bailments

-

Shopkeepers

-

Article Found in Store

-

Duty of

Storekeeper to Exercise Reasonable Care in Return
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harrison keeps a dry goods store. Mrs. Arter visited the store
with a view of making a purchase. She deposited the bag, in which
was her purse, on the counter. After looking at some goods she decided to make no purchases and left the store forgetting to take up
the bag. Meanwhile, another woman in the store, seeing the bag,
told the clerk that she was the owner. The clerk made no sufficient
inquiries, but satisfied himself that she was really the owner, without
due testing. He might have found whether the contents of the bag
could be described by the woman, but did not. He gave the bag to'
the claimant. Later the owner returned to the store and was told
of what had happened to the bag. She brings this action of trespass
for the loss of the bag and contents.
Householder, for Plaintiff.
James, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Hubley, J. The case rests entirely upon the relationship between
a shopkeeper and a prospective customer. If the relationship is that
of bailor and bailee in a mutual bailment the shopkeeper is required
to use ordinary diligence and is responsible by law for ordinary neglect in the care of customers and their possessions. That such is
the relationship in this case there is no doubt, the law on that question being well settled in Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Heydrick, in the
case of Woodruff vs. Painter & Eldridge, 150 Pa. 91, states the Pennsylvania rule clearly; holding that there is an implied contract arising
when a shopkeeper invites a customer to come to his store and the
customer accepts, the consideration being the shopkeeper's chance of
profit by the patronage received. The duty then arises from this
implied contract for the shopkeeper to use ordinary diligence in the
caring for of articles habitually carried by a customer and laid aside
while examining the goods displayed, even though no notice of the
mislaying of the article has been brought to the attention of the shopkeeper or his servant; it being held in the case cited supra and in
Bonnell vs. Stern, 112 N. Y. 539, that there is a constructive delivery
to the storekeeper.
The defendant bases his case on four contentions which the court
will answer in order to give our decision.
The defendant claims contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. With this we cannot agree. That there was negligence on
the plaintiff's part in leaving her bag we agree, but there was certainly no negligence on her part in the disposal of it after the delivery to the shopkeeper, even though this delivery was by the plaintiff's
negligence. The bag was then in his possession and its loss was entirely due to his lack of care in discovering the true owner.
The claim that the defendant was a gratuitous bailee has been refuted above, the rule being well established that the relationship is
that of a bailment for mutual benefit, MacKnight vs. Snellenburg &
Co., 80 Super. 147.
To claim that the defendant used the reasonable care required
by such a mutual bailment we cannot concur, and we think that we
can fairly find that the property was negligently disposed of by the
defendant, 1MfacKnight vs. Snellenburg & Co., 80 Supra. 147.
The fourth claim of the defendant that the defendant cannot be
held liable, because the act complained of was done by a clerk and
not by the defendant himself, cannot be sustained. The property
came into the possession of an employee of the shopkeeper and as
such he is agent for his employer, who is responsible for his negli-
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gence in the case of mislaid property of a customer; this view being
held in the case cited above.
In view of the above cited decisions and the well established
rules followed in Pennsylvania in similar cases, we must render-our
decision in favor of the plaintiff with judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Mrs. Arter, forgetfully left the bag in Harrison's store. It was
found by the clerk, who, representing Harrison, was bound to ,take
care of it until its owner reclaimed it. A woman alleged that the bag
was hers. She was not tested, by proper inquiries as to contents, etc.
The bag was improperly delivered to the woman. Later, Mrs. Arter,
returns and inquires for the bag. It could not be, and was not delivered to her.
The jury. could well find that the giving of the bag to the woman
who claimed it, was a negligent act. It has caused the loss of it to
Mrs. Arter. It does not appear that the name and residence of the
claimant were secured, so that a recovery of the bag could be facilitated, should the claim be dishonest.
It should be the duty under the circumstances stated, of the merchant to safeguard the bag, left in a fit of thoughtlessness; and to
preserve it from false claims until the owner returned, MacKnight vs.
Snellenburg & Co., 80 Super. 147.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

LEWIS VS. CRAIGHEAD
Principal and Agent for Purchase of Real Estate-Profit by AgentBreach of Duty by Agent - Equity Bill for Conveyance of
Real Estate to Principal from AgentTrustee ex-Maleficio

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lewis employed Craighead to procure for him a conveyance of a

certain piece of Teal estate for a sum not exceeding $100,000. Craighead interviewed the owner twice and the owner told him he would
sell the property for $75,000 Craighead, concealing his agency, became the purchaser and a conveyance was made to him. But before
this conveyance, Lewis, distrusting the fidelity of Craighead, had
terminated his agency. By his bill in equity Lewis asked that Craig-
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head be compelled to convey the property to him. The court decreed a conveyance on condition that Lewis simultaneously with the
tender of the deed, pay to Craighead $75,000 the price paid for it.
J. Laird, for Plaintiff.
Lavery, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Meyer, J. The single question arising from the facts is whether
or not Craighead had the right to purchase in his own name the
property which he was employed to buy for Lewis. Every agency
is subject to the legal limitation that it cannot be used for the benefit
of the agent himself, Bergner vs. Bergner, 219 Pa. 113; Powers vs.
Black, 159 Pa. 153; 31 Cyc. 1441; 21 R. C. L. 910, and where an agent
so acts in bad faith as to acquire title to real estate, equity will declare a resulting trust in the land in favor of the principal and compel
a conveyance to him, Trice vs. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620; Johnson vs.
Haywood, 103 N. W. 1058; Witte vs. Storm, 139 S. W. 384. Such a
trust falls within the exception to the Act of Apr. 22, 1856, P. L. 532
requiring declarations of trust to be evidenced by a writing this being
a trust arising by "implication or construction of law."
The contract of agency between Lewis and Craighead to negotiate for the purchase of real estate is not a contract for the creation
of an estate or interest in land, Boswell vs. Cunningham, 13 So. 354
and so does not fall within the requirement of a writing under the
Act of Mar. 21, 1772, West 20192.
It appears that in the instant case the agency was terminated
by Lewis before the actual conveyance was made, yet to declare this
to change the rule would certainly shock the conscience of a court of
equity. The essentials of the sale had been completed; that the actual conveyance had not been made is immaterial. Such a conveyance after the termination of the agency will be scrutinized thoroughly and a strong presumption of fraud and evasion will arise where
such a beneficial interest in the land in question has been acquired by
the agent so soon after the termination of the agency, 31 Cyc. 1450;
1 Am. & Eng. Enc. 378. The rule that the termination of the agency
ends all duty on the part of the agent in respect to the property applies only when he has done nothing during the continuance of the
relationship to lay a foundation for the future advantages. Morgan
vs. Aldrich, 91 S. W. 1024. Mr. Justice Gibson in Bartholomew vs.
Leech, 7 Watts 472, decided that: "there must be an unambiguous
termination of the agency before the agent can acquire a personal ine
terest in the subject of it."
In Bachrach vs. Fleming, 269 Pa. 350, Mr .Justice Schaffer said:
"Where an agent has broken faith with his principal and has been
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discharged from the business in which he was engaged, he may not,
after the termination of the agency, reap the profits of the bad faith
to his employer's disadvantage; whatever he acquired while acting
in the agency flows to his principal." We conceive the facts of this
case to be directly in point with those of the case at bar and the principles of law there applied to be expressly applicable to the instant
case..
The ruling of the court below that Craighead should be reimbursed the price he paid for the land is sustained by the cases of
Smith vs. Brotherline, 62 Pa. 461; Quinn vs. LeDuc, 51 Ati. 199.
We therefore find no error in the decision of the court below
and it is affirmed.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Lewis furnished the motive to Craighead, to learn at what price
certain land could be bought from its owner. He had a commission
for a series of acts that should eventuate in the acquisition of this
After finding the price to be $75,000 Craighead decided that
land.
he would himself become the buyer. He paid the price and obtained
a conveyance to himself. By such acts he, of course, surrendered all
rights to a commission. He had contracted to assist in procuring a
conveyance to Lewis. His procuring a conveyance to himself was a
repudiation of his duty to buy for Lewis.
The question is what shall be the result in Craighead's right to
retain the land? Shall the contract to procure from the owner a conveyance to Lewis be treated as convertible into a duty, if the land is
procured by Craighead, on him to permit Lewis to have the land, if
he chooses to pay the price to Craighead? Such seems to be the
doctrine of Bachrack vs. Fleming, 269 Pa. 350, which is applied by the
learned court below. The judgment is affirmed.

RAWLINS VS. STOKES
Equity -

Suit for Specific Performance -

Option -

Time as Es-

sence in Option

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 19, Stokes gave for ten dollars an option to Rawlins to buy a tract of land within two months. Rawlins was to indi-
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cate within that time his decision to buy and was to pay the price,
viz, $200, within one month after his notification to Stokes of his decision to buy.
Rawlins allowed six months to elapse before he decided to buy
and tender the price. Stokes declared that the option was dead and
that he would not sell. Rawlins brings this bill for specific performance of the option.
Sullivan, for Plaintiff.
Swaboski, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Turick, J. The plaintiff seeks to enforce an option with whose
terms he has failed to comply. The option called for an acceptance
in writing within two months from the date of the option. The plaintiff's acceptance occurred six months after the date of the option. We
are of the opinion that the optibn expired at the end of the two
months and the plaintiff's acceptance came too late. In Loughney vs.
Quigley, 279 Pa. 396 the court held "where a lease and an option to
purchase the demised premises is for two years beginning July 20,
1920, such lease and option expires on July 19, 1922." Applying this
rule to the case at bar any acceptance by the plaintiff bearing a date
later than November 18, would be ineffective.
The opinion required an acceptance in writing. The plaintiff's
failure to so accept was fatal to his cause. An option must be accepted within the time and manner prescribed by the terms of the option.
Until there is such an acceptance the option is only an unaccepted
offer, which lapses upon the expiration of the time during which the
option is to remain in force by the terms of the option, Henry vs.
Black, 213 Pa. 620; McMillan vs. Philadelphia Co., 159 Pa. 143; Cardon's Estate, 278 Pa. 153.
Time is of the essence of an option. The failure of the plaintiff
to accept within the specified time caused the option to lapse, Swank
vs. Fretts, 209 Pa. 625; Rhodes vs. Good, 271 Pa 117; 36 Cyc. 711.
It is true as contended by counsel for the plaintiff that the court in
Sylvester vs. Born, 132 Pa. 467, declared that as a general rule time
was not the essence of an option. The statements of the court were
dicta and not essential to the determination of that decision, and consequently not binding upon this court.
The argument that specific performance lies in the discretion of
the court and is not a matter of right has no force. It is true many
courts have made such statements but if they mean anything other
than the sound judicial discretion that a court is always required to
use in reaching a conclusion, they are clearly erroneous. Such an ar-
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gument might have had weight in the earlier stages of equity jurisprudence, but at the present time to be entitled to specific performance the plaintiff must show some established principle of law to support his right.
The bill of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The terse and well written opinion of the learned court below
leaves little to be profitably said by us. Stokes has agreed conditionally to convey land. The conditions are (a) that Rawlins would communicate, within two months from Sept. 19th, his decision to buy, and
(b) that he would pay $200, the price, within one month after his
notification that he would buy.
The two months have been prolonged into six months, before
either act of the condition was done. When the two months expired,
the option became extinct. Nothing was done to revive it, or to create a new option. The plaintiff has lost whatever right he had to
make the purchase, Loughney vs. Quigley, 279 Pa. 396; McBride's
Estate, 207 Pa. 350. The appeal is dismissed.

JAMES VS. X RAILROAD CO.
Lateral Support of Highways Traveler on Highway -

Liability of Abutting Owner to
Statute of Limitations

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Along a highway the defendant R. R. Co. excavated the ground
to the depth of fifteen feet and built its tracks. It left a space of six
feet outside of the road. In the course of time the shoulder of the six
feet had been gradually worn away and erosion had invaded the edge
of the highway. The plaintiff while driving an automobile one night
was forced by the passing vehicle to drive to the edge of the road
and he was precipitated to the depth of 15 feet. His automobile
was wrecked and he suffered serious personal injuries. He sues the
X Railroad Company for having removed the lateral support and so
causing the precipitation.
Rubenstein, for Plaintiff.
Schwartz, for Defendant.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
OPINION OF THE COURT
Schechter, J. By the above stated facts we are not called upon
to decide whether the defendant company had no right to so excavate, or whether it was done negligently. Both these facts, however,
if proven satisfactorily, by the plaintiff would have some effect in
measuring the extent of such recovery, 275 Pa. 467.
The counsel for the defendant claims that the state owns the road
in fee simple, and so the defendant owes only a duty to the state. It
is in fact immaterial in whom the title is vested and in what manner
it was acquired. If the road is a public highway, which fact is not
disputed, its existence, use and creation take al the attributes of a
fee simple title necessary to sustain the purpose of the road's origination, and lateral support is one of these attributes, 275 Pa. 467.
The question is then raised that the plaintiff may not sue as a
proper party. The primary purpose of a road is to supply an artery
of transportation to any one of the general public who so desires to
use it. As the plaintiff was a member of the general public and so
had a right to use the road, he is the proper party to sue. A somewhat similar case arose in 86 Pa. 74. A person using the highway
lawfully, fell into an excavation by the side of the road and the person causing this condition Was held liable. This doctrine was later
affirmed in the recent case of 270 Pa. 86 at page 90.
We are asked to extend the doctrine of Noonan vs. Pardee, 200
Pa. 474 to cover the facts in this case. The question in that case was
whether the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the Statute of
Limitation. This case covered subjacent support and although somewhat akin to this case, there is a distinction. It is ruled in 200 Pa.
474 that an owner of an super-incumbent estate is bound to take notice when there is a .meddilng with the subjacent support. In this case
the parties have no such inter-related rights as would compel one
party to know just what the other is doing, what its effect will be
when completed, or whether in due course of time, it will result to
his injury. So we hold that the Statute of Limitation does not begin to run until the right of action has accrued, 159 Pa. 27. In this
case the cause of action arose when the plaintiff was injured. Judgment for the plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The case referred to by the learned court below which he has
left nameless, but which is Pollock vs. R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 467, so fully
covers the questions here raised, that discussion by us is superfluous.
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When a highway is laid out, persons and corporations have no
right to modify it, by elevatng, depressing, narrowing, etc. They
have no right to interfere with the way, by lessening its safety. Here
the R. R. excavated its way, but the excavation was so near to the
highway as .to facilitate its sliding over and down, and thereby, to
make injury to vehicles and passengers likely.
The question whether the action was brought too late, finds its
answer in the case cited supra. It escapes the difficulties inherent in
Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, by abandoning the notion that the
right to sue began with the beginning of the excavation, and not
with the accident by which the plaintiff suffered the harm. This
plaintiff did not have property in the neighborhood of the scene of
the accident. Perhaps he had never been in the locality before. It
would be absurd to contend that every passenger along the road had
a right of action against it, from the beginning of the excavation. The
only visible ground of claim for damages is, not the state of the road,
unsafe as it is, but the damage to man and vehicle, in consequence of
this state.
The state or county or township might have taken action to correct the injury to the road; but individuals could not do so, because
of the possibility of their being wayfarers and as such, undergoing
injuries similar to those suffered by the plaintiff.
Possibly the state owned this road in fee. Perhaps it does not,
but has only an easement in it, as trustee for people who want to use
it. But, as we conceive, if the state owned it in fee, it would do so,
for the benefit of individual travellers, and any right to indemnity,
if they suffered an injury by interferences with the road, would be
theirs and enforceable by an action brought by them.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

